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Acharya, Amitav. Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the
Problem of Regional Order, 3rd edition, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014.
This work is an updated edition of Amitav Acharya’s most well-known work,
integrating the already rich content with a deeper focus on the issue of regional order in the
South China Sea and the relationship between the regional Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) with both China and United States. Acharya’s work is placed within the
constructivist theory of the “security community,” which emerges when a group of states
collectively renounce violence as a means of resolving their differences.1 The framework
adopted by the author originates in the work of Karl Deutsch, who was the first to theorize
the concept of security community as a distinctive form of multilateral security cooperation.
Acharya goes beyond Deutsch’s security community, adopting a sociological approach to the
study of the complexity of regionalism and “focusing on the role of norms, socialization, and
identity as central explanatory tools in the making and unmaking of security communities”
(p. 4). The forum of ASEAN provides the ideal environment for developing the study of
security communities because of its weak socio-political cohesion and the new relevance of
the Southeast Asian region in global politics.
ASEAN was founded in Bangkok in August 1967 by five countries – Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand – with the purpose of shaping their own
regional policy, avoiding the pressure of the bipolar confrontation between the United States
and the Soviet Union, and standing as a united front against communist expansion in
Southeast Asia. The founding states were dissimilar in terms of socio-cultural heritage and
identity, political agenda, and colonial and post-colonial legacy; they also lacked significant
experience with multilateral cooperation. Consequently, the evolution of ASEAN’s norms
and principles has been a delicate and precarious one, during which the member nations have
developed a specific set of core agreements to guide the conduct of intraregional relations:
(1) non-use of force – i.e., the use of peaceful resolution of disputes, (2) the acknowledgment
of regional autonomy, (3) avoidance of military pacts, and (4) the doctrine of noninterference in the internal affairs of member states. The last of the four, says Acharya, is the
“single most important principle underpinning ASEAN regionalism . . . [and] is the key
factor as to why no military conflict [has] broken out between any two member states since
1967” (p. 56). The evolution and adherence to these principles led to the creation of a
specific body of norms, known as the ASEAN “Way.” The Way is a mode of interaction
based on “discreteness, informality, consensus building, and non-confrontational bargaining
style, which is often contrasted with the adversarial posturing, majority vote, and other
legalistic decision-making procedures in Western multilateral negotiations” (p. 63). This
informal, inclusive, and non-binding framework has been the ideal tool for building trust and
confidence within the association and reflects the regional attitude towards multilateral
cooperation. The ASEAN Way has nonetheless been severely challenged by some regional
developments, particularly those occurring during the years immediately following ASEAN’s
inception. Regional autonomy was tested, and somehow lost, during the occupation of
Cambodia by Vietnamese forces in December 1978. ASEAN tried to be an effective player in
the resolution of this conflict despite the association’s limited political leverage., but
ultimately, ASEAN had to share the credit for the resolution of the conflict with Soviet Union
and People's Republic of China, two outside powers.
The ASEAN Way faced another great challenge when its members decided to expand
Members of a security community, bound by common interests, have agreed to prioritize the resoution of
social problems without resorting to force. Members of security communities share reciprocal interests, with
more mature security communities being characterized by some form of collective security measures and/or
suprantational or transnational elements.

1

Journal of International and Global Studies Volume 7, Number 1

107

the membership in the late 1990s in order to achieve the vision of “One Southeast Asia.”
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, despite their more volatile political systems and
pressing domestic issues, joined the association. Acharya alleges that the expansion both
enhanced and eroded ASEAN’s progress towards a security community because its key
norms faced new tests, such as the erosion of the non-interference principle after the
admission of Burma and Cambodia, the great diversity of political outlooks of its members
and the different attitudes among them towards military build-up, respect for human rights,
and democratic values. In addition, the admission of the Vietnamese brought to the fore the
Spratly Island dispute,2 which remains the most serious challenge to ASEAN’s regional
conflict management role and could threaten the future development of its relationship with
Beijing. Intra-regional conflicts, in Acharya’s eyes, challenge not only the internal stability of
ASEAN states but also regional stability as a whole.
Despite the growing pains associated with the admission of additional nations,
ASEAN has managed to maintain its equilibrium and has gone to specific efforts to work out
the kinks associated with expansion in order to maintain a functional security community.
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a formal, ongoing multilateral dialogue among 27
Asian Pacific regional members is the region’s broadest attempt to develop a multilateral
security forum that conforms to the association’s norms of regional autonomy and the
ASEAN Way. The ARF is the first and only regional security framework in the world in
which all major players are represented. The element of inclusivity was a new aspect of the
ASEAN institution, which set as its objective the development of friendship rather than the
identification of enemies (p. 171). Acharya is quite pessimistic regarding the development of
such a diverse security community, however, which will need to deal with some of the core
national interests of its member nations (including, for example, territorial claims and
sovereignty issues in the South China Sea). Acharya asserts that while navigating these
issues, the likelihood of ASEAN adhering to the ASEAN Way (characterized by informality,
incrementalism, and emphasis on non-binding agreements) is slim. Accordingly, skeptics of
the ARF argue that in dealing with Chinese power, “ASEAN will have to decide whether to
place their trust primarily in the ARF, or whether to place it in a US-lead balance of power”
(p. 179). The ARF’s structural problem is that its validity and influence seem to depend on
the prior existence of a stable regional balance, but the organization is not really in a position
to create it. This is why China is so confident in its ability to keep its regional status quo
within the ARF’s framework; it is also why the United States was able to increase its military
presence in the region, resurfacing as an external security guarantee. The ARF’s future is
unclear, but it has nonetheless shown itself to be a diplomatic instrument – albeit a highly
imperfect one – for coping with the new and uncertain security context.
After the economic crisis of 1997, ASEAN faced new and dangerous challenges.
Transnational terrorism, the SARS pandemic, and the Indian Ocean tsunami were the three
most delicate situations that the member nations had to deal with. ASEAN’s effectiveness in
dealing with transnational challenges has been a mixed one and has truly depended on the
nature of the challenge and the responsibility and accountability of the particular member
state involved in the first place. Acharya judges the development of the association and the
response to such challenges in a mixed way, acknowledging that some deep and structural
changes to the organization are necessary. The author’s overview is clear when he says that
“to a large extent, the problems facing ASEAN in the late 1990s could be explained in terms
of the burden imposed by membership expansion and the emergence of new sources of intraThe Spratly Island dispute is a territorial dispute between Brunei, China, Malaysia, The Phillippines, Taiwan,
and Vietnam concerning the ownership of a group of islands and their associated martime “features” (reefs,
banks, and cays) located in the South China Sea. Low level military occupation by all disputing parties (except
Brunei) and diplomatic stalemate characterize the dispute at this time.
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regional and transnational conflict . . . . ASEAN might have overestimated its capacity to
assume the role of driver in the development of the ARF, ASEAN Plus Three, and East Asia
Summit. These burdens now challenge the sanctity of ASEAN’s norms and the credibility of
the ASEAN Way, including the doctrines of non-use of force and non-intervention” (p. 262).
ASEAN has so far survived multiple challenges, but it must now question its very
own normative soul. The ASEAN Way is seen as stale, less-than-functional in light of the
globalized challenges that the association faces. In conclusion, Acharya says that over the
course of the next few decades, we might come to see ASEAN either as the wise counselor of
Asia or as a marginalized relic of the past, unable to adapt and shape its nature to the
globalized political agenda. To avoid the latter fate, Acharya suggests that “ASEAN
leaders . . . stay united, strengthen mechanisms for cooperation, steadfastly maintain a
neutral image among the great powers, and be attentive to their people’s voices. By doing so,
they will have a good chance of retaining ASEAN’s driver’s seat in Asian regional
cooperation and turning Southeast Asia into a genuine pluralistic security community” (p.
267).
Constructing a security community in Southeast Asia is a groundbreaking work and an
important landmark for the study of regional and international security. The text under review
is written in a clear and wise way, with a deep analysis of the regional dynamics of Southeast
Asia and its future developments. It is addressed to students and scholars of the area’s
academic community, but it would also be a vivid read for those who are recently
approaching the issue, such as journalists and media.
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